The Minister of Foreign Affairs summarized for the President the contents of Gorbachev`s “rather positive” letter, which would be delivered to Reagan later that day by Shevardnadze. Shultz agreed to a summit in Washington in early December and found that he was flexible in various Gorbachev proposals. After officially receiving the letter from Shevardnadze, Reagan announced the agreement at the summit in the White House press room, alongside Shultz and Shevardnadze. In this memorandum prepared for Gorbachev`s report to the Politburo on the outcome of the Washington summit, Chernyaev lists all the achievements of the summit, including in the management of the negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons. According to Chernyaev, there was a real risk that the outcome of the summit would be limited to the ISP treaty, without any progress being made on START issues. It notes that progress has been made in finding solutions to the following difficult issues: provisions relating to compliance with the AMB Treaty, restrictions on strategic missile warheads and warheads on sea-firing. Chernyaev also talks about Reagan`s negotiating style, “his incompetence,” pointing out that true power is “in the bush, Carlucci and others around him” group – but Gorbachev decided not to use that part of the memo in his proper presentation of the political bureau, and in his December 17 report he spoke very positively of Reagan. December 12, 1987 Telegram: Secretary`s 12/11 NAC Briefing on Washington Summit September 5, 1987 GRIP 27D [“Should the United States change its current position on U.S. warheads on DEG Pershing IA missiles?”] The treaty contained remarkably broad and intrusive inspection and surveillance provisions, based on the “at any time and everywhere” proposal of March 1987, accepted by the Soviets to the surprise of the Americans; and the documents show that the Soviets were ready to go beyond the American position in the depths of the verification regime. The new Soviet position on verification eliminated not only the seemingly insurmountable obstacle, but also after the United States of the time. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock became a symbol of the new confidence that developed in US-Soviet relations, allowing the treaty and further progress in arms control. The two leaders referred at different times to the Soviet-American alliance against Germany during World War II. At the arrival ceremony, Gorbachev also called for the call of history to improve the aura of this summit.
Last year, Reagan became a rare opportunity to make a new breakthrough. At least it can advance a proposal that moves to the next presidency. Under these conditions, the Soviet leader skilfully insists that he reach as much as possible, while Reagan still thinks of the store.